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Abstract:  Are China and India emerging as technological powerhouses in the 21st 
century?  This essay reviews the interdisciplinary debate that has been inspired by this 
question in recent years.  It begins by considering recent studies that are relatively 
impressed with China and India’s recent accomplishments and potential in this regard.  
Next, it reviews works that are less impressed with their track records and prospects.  It 
then considers a series of more equivocal studies that remain more or less undecided 
about China and India’s technological trajectories.  The final section evaluates the debate 
as a whole and proposes new directions for scholarship in this field.     
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Technological creativity represents a key source of national power, a point long 
recognized by international relations scholars.  New technologies not only spur economic 
growth and national prosperity, but can also provide states with leverage in international 
trade.  New technologies from railroads to nuclear energy have also generated new 
sources of military power, at least for states that can surmount the financial and 
organizational hurdles to military innovation (Horowitz 2010).  Moreover, nations vary 
widely in their innovative capacities.  Long cycle theorists, who have probed the 
connections between technology and national power with particular care, note that 
technological development at a given point in history tends to cluster in a single national 
economy, from which it diffuses throughout the international system (Thompson 1990; 
Modelski and Thompson 1996). 
 In this context, it is not surprising that technological innovation should be a 
pressing preoccupation for rising powers.  To be sure, a rising state may simply be a “fast 
follower,” rapidly adopting new technologies invented elsewhere rather than creating 
them on its own.  When the hurdles to imitation are high, however, the advantages of 
possessing a new technology first – both in the economic and military spheres – can be 
considerable (Milner and Yoffie 1989; Mueller 1997; Horowitz 2010).  Indeed, the 
historical record makes clear that technological innovation often helps fuel the rise of 
new powers.  Germany rose to economic prominence in the late 19th century as it 
“institutionalized innovation” in what David Landes calls “the second wind” of the 
industrial revolution (Landes 2003, 352).  The rise of the United States in the early and 
mid-20th century was not simply a function of its increasingly vast economy, but also 
technological leadership in areas ranging from electric light to mass production to air 
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transport (Gordon 2004, 23–34).  Following World War II, Japan’s remarkable rise in 
automotive and information technology led to predictions that it would eclipse the U.S. as 
the world’s leading economy, expectations that have faded as Japan has struggled to keep 
up in the age of the Internet (Drezner 2001). 
Today’s rising powers - China and India in particular – are certainly not content to 
rely on the outside world for new technologies.  In 2006, China’s National Medium- and 
Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), or MLP, 
was launched to rapidly advance “indigenous innovation” and to promote 16 
“megaprojects” in particular (State Council 2006).1  The MLP was spurred in part by 
dissatisfaction with China’s role in the world economy, as well as a conviction that 
foreign companies would no longer transfer technologies, particularly advanced 
technologies, to Chinese firms (Cao, Suttmeier, and Simon 2006, 41).  The document 
itself argued that “in areas critical to the national economy and security, core 
technologies cannot be purchased” and that China should “take the initiative in the fierce 
international competition.”  Yet the MLP hardly endorsed autarky:  the document listed a 
range of shortcomings in China’s own science and technology system and concluded that 
international cooperation would be essential for China going forward.  In 2010, China 
added a follow-on plan to speed the development of seven “Strategic Emerging 
Industries” – an effort to place Chinese companies at the forefront of technological 
innovation.2  While more targeted than the MLP, this initiative also represents a striking 
mix of technological ambition, nationalist anxiety, and international outreach.   
India has its own ambitions.  While lacking plans as detailed and dirigiste as the 
MLP, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh unveiled a new national Science, Technology, 
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and Innovation (STI) Policy in early 2013 (Government of India 2013).  While the new 
policy sounded more relaxed about international competition than China’s MLP, there is 
no little anxiety in India about falling behind other countries – particularly as China raises 
its technological ambitions (Krishna 2013).  Indeed, Singh lamented in 2012 that India’s 
position in “the world of science” had been declining for decades (India Today Online 
2012).  In response, the new STI policy aspires to place India “among the top five global 
scientific powers” by 2020.  Toward this end, the policy called for doubling the country’s 
research and development (R&D) spending to 2 percent of GDP – a longstanding goal of 
Singh’s government – over five years, through a mix of public-private partnerships and 
greater private investment.  It also called for quadrupling India’s share of articles in elite 
scientific journals, from 2.5 percent to 10 percent, and raising the participation of women 
in STI activities.  The policy also stated that “around 10 sectors of high impact potential” 
would be chosen for “directed STI intervention and deployment of requisite resources.”  
While it remains to be seen how these various goals will be pursued, it is clear that India 
is looking to raise its profile in the world of science and technology.  
If China and India are preoccupied with improving their technological creativity, 
the question remains how successful they have been in this regard in recent years, as well 
as what we should expect of them in the future.  In recent years, a diverse array of 
scholars has taken up these questions with great interest.  The result has been a 
fascinating interdisciplinary debate, but no clear consensus has emerged.  As described 
below, some scholars are impressed with China and India’s track records and offer 
positive assessments of their future prospects.  Others are decidedly critical and 
downplay the potential of these states to become innovation powerhouses.  A third group 
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of scholars offers more ambiguous assessments and remains essentially undecided about 
the future. 
To shed more light on this question, this essay reviews the ongoing debate over 
China and India’s emergence as technological powers.  The goal here is not to decide 
who is “winning” the debate, which will undoubtedly continue for years to come.  
Instead, my purpose is to explore the various arguments and to suggest new directions for 
the literature in the future.  The essay begins by considering recent studies that are 
relatively impressed with China and India’s recent accomplishments and potential in 
technological innovation.  Next, it reviews works that are relatively unimpressed.  It then 
considers a range of more equivocal studies that have explored China and India’s 
strengths and weaknesses, and that remain more or less undecided about the future.  The 
final section evaluates the debate as a whole and proposes some new directions for 
scholarship in this field.    
 
The Impressed 
As China and India have recorded remarkable economic progress over the past 
few decades, a number of scholars have been impressed by their emergence as 
technological powers as well.  There is considerable diversity within this group, and it 
would be inaccurate to suggest that they share the same conception of “innovation” and 
what drives it.  Nonetheless, there are some underlying themes in these writings.  First, 
they tend to be less theoretical and more empirical.  More precisely, they tend to be 
concerned with documenting China and India’s progress in terms of relatively traditional 
indicators of innovation, such as scientific publications, national expenditure on R&D, 
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and patent data.  Second, some (if not all) of these writers suggest that the shift to greater 
innovation in China and India is a natural result of economic development – and even 
inevitable.  Third, and most universally, these writings are not only impressed with China 
and India’s track records to date but also optimistic about their future prospects.  
To begin, Carl Dahlman contends that innovation in China and India should be 
understood to include not just knowledge that is new to the world, but also knowledge 
that is new to these countries (Dahlman 2010; Dahlman 2007).  That is, he is not simply 
concerned with whether China and India are making advances at the technological 
frontier, but with the process of technological modernization within these countries more 
broadly.  Dahlman’s approach is systematic: he assesses efforts to acquire foreign 
technology (through inward FDI and technology licensing); efforts to develop domestic 
technologies (through education and R&D spending); and efforts to diffuse technology 
domestically (by examining penetration rates of personal computers, for example) 
(Dahlman 2010).  Comparing China with India as well as Brazil, Dahlman concludes that 
China has been more successful than the other two in all three respects.  Yet he seems 
impressed with the track record of all three countries when it comes to innovation (as he 
defines it); Dahlman writes that “all three countries have made major technological 
innovations” (34).  His conclusion is particularly optimistic about both China and India, 
suggesting that both of the Asian giants “are well on their way to becoming major 
technological powers” (44). 
Like Dahlman, Ernest Preeg considers technological development in broad terms 
and comes away impressed with both China and India.  As early as 2008, he characterized 
China as a “fully engaged technology superstate” (Preeg 2008, 11).  India, meanwhile, 
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was five to ten years behind China, but nonetheless “clearly an emerging advanced 
technology superstate.”  While the meaning of these terms remains murky throughout his 
text, the empirical investigation is quite broad:  Preeg considers technology policy, R&D 
spending, technical education, foreign direct investment, the composition of national 
trade, the innovation of domestic enterprises, patent data, and academic publications.3  
The analysis does not always support the rather dramatic conclusion, however.  Preeg 
notes that there are “major weaknesses” (41) in university education in both China and 
India, for example.  He argues that innovation in information technology and 
telecommunications is “lifting China and India toward advanced technology superstate 
status,” but suggests that this process remains poorly understood and that the relative 
importance of domestic and foreign firms in it remains unclear (102).  Looking ahead, 
Preeg characterizes China’s drive for indigenous innovation as a “high-risk” (29) 
strategy, given the role of foreign firms in China’s development.  
Recent writings touting the rise of “Chindia” have emphasized that China and 
India’s emergence as centers of innovation is natural and even inevitable.  In Chindia 
Rising, Jagdish Sheth writes that “the journey of industrialization inevitably leads up the 
value chain” and foresees “an advancing wave of Chindian innovation” (Sheth 2008, 75).  
He not only cites the potential for educational reforms in China and India to produce 
millions of talented technicians and engineers, he also suggests that Chindia is emerging 
as “the world’s R&D capital” (79).  Peter Engardio’s Chindia is more circumspect, but he 
also sees China and India’s emergence as technology powers as inevitable. “It is only a 
matter of time,” he writes, “before India and China are at the forefront in technological 
innovation” (Engardio 2007, 169).  Engardio concedes that problems such as intellectual 
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property protection will hold them back in the near-term, but he stresses that both 
countries boast growing numbers of science and engineering graduates, rising R&D 
expenditures, and deepening ties with technology companies and universities abroad.  
Some writers are impressed with China in particular.  Hu Angang’s China in 2020 
is a case in point (Hu 2011).  Like the “Chindia” scholars, Hu sees China’s emergence as 
a technology power as inevitable, thanks to its rapid economic growth, though he also 
stresses the role of globalization and government policy.  In fact, his assessment is not 
only strikingly optimistic, but also remarkably precise.  Hu decomposes what he calls 
national “S&T power” into five national capacities, each of which has a quantitative 
indicator: 
1) Capacity for innovation in science (number of papers published in 
international scientific journals); 
2) Capacity for innovation in technology (invention patent applications filed 
by residents with national patent office); 
3) Capacity to use new technologies (number of people using computers 
within the country); 
4) Capacity to use global information (number of people with Internet 
access within the country); 
5) Capacity for R&D (R&D expenditures in purchasing power parity terms). 
 
Taking these measures together, Hu concludes that China is already a “strong innovative 
power” (95), with 9.7 percent of the world’s S&T power as of 2007, compared to 14.6 
percent for Japan and 23.2 percent for the US (110).  Hu adds that China’s performance 
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makes clear that it will overtake these two countries to become “the world’s largest S&T 
power” (110).  Notably, India does not figure as an S&T power of consequence in Hu’s 
assessment. 
A few impressed scholars defy the general trend in the “impressed” literature and 
focus on less obvious indicators of innovation.  Nirmalya Kumar and Phanish Puranam, 
for example, contend that much of the innovation that occurs within India is “invisible” 
and that the country is underrated as a technology power as a result (Kumar and Puranam 
2012).  With MNCs segmenting innovation into a range of tasks conducted in multiple 
locales across the globe, as well as outsourcing some activities to other firms, India has 
taken advantage.  MNCs have set up hundreds of captive R&D units in India, as well as 
outsourcing IT work to firms like Infosys and Wipro, thereby taking advantage of India’s 
pool of educated but inexpensive labor.  The result is that Indian knowledge workers play 
a role in creating many new products, but the patents and products are identified with the 
western multinationals rather than the Indian labor that developed them.   
Notably, the potential for industrial espionage has not featured prominently in the 
writings of impressed scholars.  In a sense, this is not surprising:  most of the above 
studies were completed before allegations of Chinese espionage began to receive 
sustained attention in the media.  Still, these allegations are certainly fueling concern that 
western technological secrets are being siphoned off with frightening speed.  A report 
published by the U.S. intelligence community in 2011 called China and Russia “the most 
aggressive collectors of U.S. economic information and technology” (United States 
Office of The National Counterintelligence Executive 2011, 4).  In 2012, James 
Alexander, the Director of the U.S. National Security Agency, said that cyber-espionage 
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was leading to “the greatest transfer of wealth in history” (“Chinese Hackers Steal 
Everything” 2012).  As noted below, however, not all observers agree that industrial 
espionage is having such a dramatic impact. 
In short, a number of scholars are impressed with the pace with which China and 
India are emerging as technological powers.  As noted above, while there is considerable 
diversity in this literature, there are also several underlying themes.  There is a clear 
tendency to focus on relatively traditional, quantitative indicators of technological 
progress, such as national R&D spending and patent data, rather than underlying 
institutions or processes.  In addition, some impressed scholars see innovation as an 
inevitable outgrowth of China and India’s rapid economic development.  Most 
fundamentally, they all share a conviction that China and India have made considerable 
progress to date, and that their prospects in this realm are bright.  
 
The Unimpressed 
Notwithstanding China and India’s rapid economic growth in recent decades, 
some scholars remain decidedly unimpressed with their technological trajectories.  
Whether explicit or implicit, a key theme in this literature is the deficiencies in China and 
India’s technology policies or their “national innovation systems” more broadly.  The 
latter refers to the set of relationships between government, academic, and private actors 
that undergird the creation and diffusion of new technologies (Nelson 1993; Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 1997).  In this view, innovative capacity is 
does not arise easily and is not an inevitable product of development; it rests on a 
complex web of social and economic ties that must be nurtured and sustained over time.  
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Accordingly, many of these scholars are more concerned with relationships, mindsets, 
and incentives than with more readily quantified indicators of innovation.  When these 
scholars do consider quantitative evidence, they typically critique the quality of the data 
emerging from these Asian giants, and they also note the need to consider absolute 
differences between countries as well as growth rates.  
To begin, critics of China’s innovation system make a number of points.  In 2004, 
George Gilboy cited a range of constraints on China’s innovative capacity, including low 
corporate spending on R&D as a percentage of revenue, a failure to invest in indigenizing 
imported technologies, and a lack of industrial collaboration and horizontal networking, 
among others (Gilboy 2004, 42–46).  In 2008, the OECD produced its own, fairly critical, 
assessment of China’s national innovation system.  It noted that while China was making 
concerted investments in R&D and human capital, the enterprise system remained weak 
and “a proportionate increase in innovation performance” had yet to take place (OECD 
2008, 17).  In 2012, Michael Beckley described China as mired in “technological 
stagnation” and listed a wide range of shortcomings in its national innovation system and 
performance (Beckley 2012, 69).  Among other things, Beckley highlighted misconduct 
in scientific research, the reluctance of Chinese companies to invest in R&D and new 
products, and the country’s reliance on foreign companies.  As Beckley concluded, “a 
comparison of U.S. and Chinese innovation systems over the past twenty years provides 
strong evidence against declinism and in favor of the alternative perspective that China 
continues to lag behind the United States” (72). 
Criticisms of China’s innovative capacity are certainly not limited to foreigners; 
knowledgeable Chinese scholars have also raised concerns.  Zhao Zhiyun and Yang 
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Chaofeng, for example, are scholars at the Institute of Scientific and Technical 
Information of China (ISTIC), a research institute under the Ministry of Science and 
Technology.  They maintain that while technology imports have contributed substantially 
to China’s growing total factor productivity from 1979 to 2009, China’s own R&D 
spending has contributed quite little in this regard (Zhao and Yang 2011).  In a separate 
study, Yang and Zhao argue that the productivity of China’s R&D spending is far below 
that of developed countries (Yang and Zhao 2009).  Zhao and Du Hongliang (also of 
ISTIC), meanwhile, have also explored the international influence of China’s science and 
technology (Du and Zhao 2010).  While noting some successes, they also list a range of 
constraints that hold China back, including a preoccupation with economic growth rather 
than education, a deficiency of innovative talent, and the policies of some developed 
countries. 
Critics of India’s innovation system are readily found as well.  Rishikesha 
Krishnan of the India Institute of Management in Bangalore asks why India, with so 
many individually talented people, has failed to live up to its “innovation potential” 
(Krishnan 2010).  Among other things, he highlights the lack of innovation inputs:  
inadequate public and private funding, limited management capacity in many enterprises, 
and the failure of the university system to undertake cutting-edge research or provide 
sufficient numbers of well-trained knowledge workers.  Krishnan also points to social 
and cultural barriers to innovation in India.  These include poor teamwork, a relaxed 
attitude toward deadlines, a lack of confidence in innovation capabilities, excessively 
hierarchical organizations, and a low tolerance for failure.  V.V. Krishna of Jawaharlal 
Nehru University also worries that India is not living up to its potential.  He cites a lack 
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of government commitment to R&D, inadequate links between different types of 
organizations, and “official neglect” of the country’s universities (Krishna 2013).  
Focusing on information and telecommunications technologies (ITT) in particular, 
Anindya Chaudhuri sees India as lagging far behind the US and increasingly behind 
China as well (Chaudhuri 2012).  He suggests that the Indian government makes too little 
effort to ensure that the R&D activities conducted by foreign firms in India generate 
positive spillovers for the country more generally.  He also laments that Indian software 
firms generate little intellectual property of their own, focus on businesses rather than 
consumers, and are too reliant on the US market.   
There is also concern with specific Chinese and Indian initiatives and policies – or 
the lack thereof.  For China, the concern is excessive state activism.  Following the 
release of the MLP in 2006, Sylvia Serger and Magnus Breidne wrote that the plan 
assumed that innovation could be “decreed from above” (Serger and Breidne 2007, 161). 
They noted that it was written “by and for civil servants” and worried that too little 
attention had been paid to entrepreneurs, customers, and the market (157).  Following the 
release of the SEI, Barry Naughton outlined additional concerns with what he called the 
“protectionist elements” in China’s approach (Naughton 2011, 326).  These include the 
danger that protectionist policies will become increasingly costly and difficult to undo 
over time and that they will alienate important economic partners.  Naughton also warned 
that state intervention to “pick winners” at the technological frontier will prove much 
more difficult and costly for China than was the case when the goal was simply 
technological catch-up in established industries (327).  With regard to China’s industrial 
espionage, some are doubtful that it does the country much good.  James Lewis suggests 
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that cyber-theft costs the United States “no more than $100 billion a year and perhaps 
much less” — what he called “a rounding error in our $15 trillion economy” (Lewis 
2013).  Lewis adds that China probably lacks the technical skills and industrial base in 
some high-tech areas to turn stolen intellectual property into competitive advantage. 
On the Indian side, the opposite critique has been made: the state is not too active, 
but too timid.  Ramaseshan Ramachandran writes that the Indian state has repeatedly 
devised plans to strengthen its science and technology base, but laments that it has never 
supported these plans with economic measures (Ramachandran 2002). Krishnan writes 
that the Indian government has failed to support industrial innovation in the reform era 
for several reasons – perhaps most basically because Indian leaders, such as Manmohan 
Singh, are ideologically averse to state intervention in the economy (Krishnan 2010, 130–
31).  Krishnan calls for a more flexible mindset and a raft of new measures, including an 
expansion and reorganization of public support for technology development and 
commercialization.  More recently, V.V. Krishna has criticized India’s new Science, 
Technology, and Innovation Policy as “high on goals” but “low on commitment” 
(Krishna 2013).  In Krishna’s view, stronger efforts must be made to boost national R&D 
and to strengthen the national university system.  
Lastly, while critics often focus on China and India’s innovation systems or 
policies, it is not the case that they simply ignore traditional quantitative indicators of 
innovation activity.  Instead, there are at least two lines of critique in this regard.  First, 
some dismiss some of the more impressive figures emerging from these Asian giants as 
misleading.  Xuan Li and Yogesh Pai, for example, note that Chinese patent data give a 
distorted picture of innovation in the country (Li and Pai 2010, 73).  In particular, they 
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note that patents by domestic residents in China include those of joint ventures and 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises, which are treated as domestic enterprises for purposes 
of Chinese law.  Second, critics tend to focus less on growth rates and more on absolute 
differences between “rising” states and developed countries.  Vincent Shie and Craig 
Meer, for example, compare China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan with the U.S. and 
Japan in this regard (Shie and Meer 2010).  Focusing on R&D spending, patent 
applications, and invention patents granted in the U.S., the authors conclude that the 
United States and Japan retain formidable leads, notwithstanding rapid growth in the 
developing countries.  A follow-on study comparing China with the U.S. and Japan by 
Shie, Meer, and Nian-Feng Shin also finds persistent absolute differences (Shie, Meer, 
and Shin 2012).  Focusing on the U.S. and China in particular, Sheena Chestnut and Iain 
Johnston, as well as Michael Beckley, reach similar conclusions (Chestnut and Johnston 
2009, 246–48; Beckley 2012, 69–71).  
To sum up, a significant contingent of scholars remain unimpressed with China 
and India’s ascents as technological powers.  These critics tend to highlight shortcomings 
in the national innovation systems of these two countries, with problems ranging from 
academic research to corporate behavior to university systems.  Critics also fault specific 
initiatives and policies in both countries, with the Chinese government criticized as 
excessively interventionist and the Indian government charged with being insufficiently 
supportive.  While these critics are frequently concerned with Chinese and Indian 
institutions, they do not disregard quantitative indicators.  Instead, they often critique the 
data emerging from these Asian giants as misleading, and they also note the need to 
consider absolute differences between countries as well as growth rates.  
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The Undecided  
 A third group of scholars is hard to classify as “unimpressed” or “impressed.”  
Like the unimpressed scholars, this group tends to look beyond the standard indicators of 
innovation performance.  Unlike the unimpressed scholars, however, this group sees the 
evidence as highly ambiguous.  Whereas unimpressed scholars see China and India’s 
innovation systems as beset with problems, this group includes scholars who see 
improvement in some areas – and even strengths – even as many problems remain.  
Others are more concerned with other types of relationships and processes, such as the 
globalization of innovation, but still come away with equivocal conclusions.  These 
scholars thus tend to be highly uncertain about what the future holds – and are best 
classified as “undecided.” 
As suggested above, there are several distinct sub-themes in this literature.  First, 
some scholars in this group focus their attention on innovation systems and processes.  
Distinguishing between the tangible and intangible ingredients of technological 
innovation, they tend to laud China or India’s capabilities with respect the former, while 
expressing concern about the latter (Bound 2007; Wilsdon and Keeley 2007; Cao, Simon, 
and Suttmeier 2009; Segal 2011).  Cong Cao, Denis Simon, and Richard Suttmeier, for 
example, note China’s impressive achievements in R&D and scientific publications, but 
they caution that serious weaknesses remain in building an enterprise-centered innovation 
system, ensuring that R&D funds are well-spent, and protecting intellectual property.  
Similarly, Adam Segal distinguishes between the “hardware” and the “software” of 
innovation; the former refers to such key elements as money, technicians, and equipment, 
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while the latter includes legal protections, risk-tolerance, individual initiative, capital 
markets, and connections between industry and academia (Segal 2011, 22–27).  Segal 
maintains that China and India are rapidly improving their hardware, but that 
strengthening their national software is just as critical and will take decades.    
Culture is sometimes singled out by these writers as a key intangible element of 
innovation – and an area in which China and India need to improve.  “While on the 
surface Chinese entrepreneurs and researchers are encouraged to think outside the box 
and not be afraid of failure,” Cao, Simon, and Suttmeier write, “at least equally important 
is that other ingredients of a true innovation culture – autonomy, free access to and flow 
of information, and especially dissent, scientific as well as political – are not adequately 
applauded or tolerated” (Cao, Simon, and Suttmeier 2009, 258).  Other scholars make a 
similar points with respect to China (Segal 2011, 70; Wilsdon and Keeley 2007, 34).  
While Indian society is comparatively free, some suggest that the extent to which such 
freedom works to its advantage remains to be seen.  As Bound writes, “whether 
democracy Indian style is good for science – by providing the basis for the freedom of 
thought and speech critical to innovation –will be key to how India’s development differs 
from China’s” (41).  Nonetheless, if there is criticism or concern about culture, these 
scholars also perceive potential for change.  Segal, for example, refers to India’s 
“emerging culture of entrepreneurship,” while also suggesting how venture capital firms 
and returnees from abroad can be “carriers of the culture of innovation” (20,55, 65).  
James Wilsdon and James Keeley also suggest that returnees from abroad can play 
important roles in reshaping practices in China (Wilsdon and Keeley 2007, 30).   
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Other undecided scholars are primarily concerned with China and India’s roles in 
global innovation networks (GINs) – corporate R&D activities that transcend national 
borders.  In general, these assessments point to significant – but still limited – roles for 
China and India.  Gert Bruche, for example, observes that China and India’s roles in 
GINs are increasingly important but mainly confined to the information technology 
sector (Bruche 2009).  He adds that that multinational firms’ R&D in China and India is 
generally of lower technological value added, but notes that upgrading is in progress, and 
that China and India may contribute “mission critical” R&D down the road.  Dieter Ernst, 
in turn, explores the role played by Asian countries, including China and India, within 
GINs in the electronics industry (Ernst 2009).  He notes that these countries are doing 
increasingly impressive work within such networks, and that they should aspire to more 
important roles in the future.  For time being, however, Ernst suggests that the U.S., 
Europe and Japan “retain their dominance in science and in high-impact intellectual 
property, enabling them to control the emerging new geography of knowledge” (viii).  Ed 
Steinfeld, meanwhile, underscores how important foreign firms have become for 
innovation in China in particular.  As he puts it, foreign-owned R&D centers “are the 
Chinese innovation system” (Steinfeld 2010, 172).  But where other scholars tend to 
emphasize the dominance of multinationals firms in GINs, Steinfeld suggests that 
globalization means that commercial distinctions between “us” and “them” are 
increasingly blurry, and that Chinese and foreign firms often have similar interests.  
Tilman Altenburg, Hubert Schmitz, and Andreas Stamm combine the two 
perspectives above in an assessment of China and India’s progress (Altenburg, Schmitz, 
and Stamm 2008).  That is, they suggest that scholars must consider both national 
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innovation systems and global networks when evaluating the progress that China and 
India are making.  Drawing on a series of traditional indicators as well as case studies of 
four industries, they argue that substantial investments in each country’s innovation 
system and extensive use of global networks have led to “partial success” (337).  On the 
positive side of the ledger, both countries have shown growing capabilities for 
technology absorption, reverse engineering, and incremental innovation.  Yet they 
conclude that both China and India lag far behind OECD countries in terms of the central 
focus of their study – the capacity for “new to the world” innovation.  The authors 
conclude that China and India are likely to make inroads into the latter in the future, 
though they suggest that multiple scenarios are possible.  
Focusing on China in particular, other scholars highlight where it excels, and 
suggest where it does not, by looking beyond novel product innovation.  Loren Brandt 
and Eric Thun, for example, are not concerned with the creation of new products, but 
with the technological upgrading of Chinese firms (Brandt and Thun 2010).  Focusing on 
autos, computer numerically controlled machine tools, and construction equipment, they 
show how some Chinese firms invest in more sophisticated technologies to upgrade their 
products and escape vicious price competition at the bottom of the market.  Foreign 
firms, meanwhile, are forced to downgrade their products to compete on price.  The result 
is a furious “fight for the middle” in which Chinese and foreign firms compete for a 
growing swathe of mid-range customers.  Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree also 
eschew a focus on novel product innovation.  They emphasize instead a range of 
secondary innovation processes that follow the invention of new products (Breznitz and 
Murphree 2011).  These consist of “second-generation innovation” – including the 
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mixing of established technologies and products to come up with new solutions – as well 
as organizational, incremental, and process innovation.  Breznitz and Murphree contend 
that China excels at such secondary innovation processes and that trying to move from 
this specialty to novel product innovation – as the MLP and the SEI envisage – is both 
unnecessary and risky.  Jonas Nahm and Ed Steinfeld, meanwhile, characterize China’s 
specialty somewhat differently (Nahm and Steinfeld 2012).  They argue that China excels 
at “innovative manufacturing,” and that its particular genius lies in rapid scale-up and 
cost reduction.  This means that Chinese firms can not only reverse-engineer existing 
products to make them cheaper, but also make new inventions commercially viable – 
whether these are invented by the Chinese manufacturer or elsewhere.  It also allows 
creative collaborations between Chinese manufacturers and foreign companies in which 
knowledge can flow in both directions.  In each of these studies, “innovation” in some 
sense is happening in China, but not necessarily the creation of new products. 
Some recent scholarship on the Chinese and Indian diasporas, and the 
transnational flow of human capital to and from these countries in particular, also offers 
an ambiguous picture of their technological trajectories.  The challenge that the “brain 
drain” – the flow of top talent to more developed countries – poses for China and India’s 
development has long been recognized (Zweig and Chen 1995; Cao and Suttmeier 2002; 
Orleans 1988; Oommen 1989).  More recent work indicates that this problem is still a 
serious challenge for both countries.  Yet this work also makes clear that the flow of 
human talent is no longer a one-way street, and the term “brain circulation” has come into 
vogue (Saxenian 2002; Saxenian 2006).   Denis Simon and Cong Cao note that not only 
have more than 300,000 Chinese students returned to China, but also that the Chinese 
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diaspora abroad is a considerable asset, one that facilitates knowledge flows, foreign 
investment, and local entrepreneurship (Simon and Cao 2009, 244).  David Zweig and 
Wang Huiyao, in turn, have weighed China’s recent efforts to lure back top talent, noting 
both the extent and limit of the country’s success in this regard.  With Lin Xiaohua, they 
have also described how the successes that these recent efforts have achieved have 
spurred China’s development (Wang, Zweig, and Lin 2011).  On the Indian side, recent 
work by Devesh Kapur has noted not only that India suffers from a serious outflow of 
talent, but also that this outflow creates incentives for many Indians to invest more in 
education in order to pursue such opportunities – a “brain gain” (Kapur 2010, 119–122).  
Kapur also describes how members of the Indian diaspora have contributed substantially 
to the development of innovation hubs like Bangalore (95).  In short, the common thread 
here is not that the brain drain challenge has disappeared, but that both China and India 
are also profiting from the circulation of expertise, money, and ideas that their respective 
diasporas enable. 
A final theme in this literature is that the future of China and India as 
technological powers is uncertain.  Brandt and Thun are unsure who will win the “fight 
for the middle” between Chinese firms and MNCs that they document (Brandt and Thun 
2010, 1571).  They are also uncertain whether Chinese firms will successfully upgrade in 
other sectors, particularly if the pace of technological change is more rapid.  Focusing on 
GINs, Ernst notes that there are both dangers and opportunities for Asian countries in 
such networks.  GINs could be “poisoned chalices” that lock their knowledge workers 
into subordinate roles, or they could be opportunities to move into more challenging and 
rewarding innovation tasks – if Asian governments work to improve their innovation 
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systems (Ernst 2009, 38–42).  Segal also sees the future as unclear, but he sees the United 
States as the key actor.   The question, in Segal’s view, is whether the U.S. will build on 
its existing strengths in the software of innovation, while also strengthening its 
connections to other centers of excellence around the world (Segal 2011, 237–49).  For 
Bruche, the future depends on the interaction of conflicting forces (Bruche 2009, 280–
81).  China and India will benefit from growing market size, and multinational 
subsidiaries in these countries will presumably continue to upgrade and take on more 
challenging tasks.  Yet he also sees risks as well.  Managing global R&D networks can 
present a formidable challenge for Chinese and Indian companies, and there is some risk 
of policy change in China and India due to internal strife or geopolitical conflict.   
 
New Directions 
 The preceding three sections reveal that there are widely divergent views of China 
and India’s prospects as technological powers.  There are reasons to commend, as well as 
criticize, each of these perspectives.  The impressed scholars have marshaled an 
impressive array of evidence to highlight the progress that China and India have made, 
which in many respects is remarkable.  Some of the indicators of progress, however, are 
of dubious value.  Comparing countries in terms of invention patents recorded 
domestically, for example, is difficult to justify, not only because some may be recorded 
by foreign firms but also because there are good reasons to believe that the quality of 
patents granted in China are of lower quality (Liang 2012).  Unimpressed scholars have 
done an excellent job of taking a more critical approach to the data, as well as 
highlighting problems in China and India’s innovation systems.  Yet as others have 
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noted, innovation has historically flourished in widely varying environments, and it 
remains a poorly understood phenomenon (Steinfeld 2010, 171).  It is thus difficult to 
suggest that there is one “right way” to structure a national innovation system.  The 
undecided scholars, in turn, have brought a welcome degree of nuance into the debate.  
Their reluctance to make clear-cut predictions about the future also seems wise.  Yet this 
remains a wide-ranging literature in itself, and the scholars within it have a variety of 
different preoccupations.  It is thus the least cohesive school of thought and the most 
difficult to synthesize. 
In short, each school of thought has both strengths and weaknesses, and I make no 
pretense here of choosing one clear “winner.”  Instead, my purpose in this final section is 
to critique the literature as a whole by highlighting a few key questions that deserve more 
attention.  First, while the growing attention to technology and innovation in China and 
India has been illuminating, more attention could and should be paid to variation between 
and within the two countries.  There is a particular need for more in-depth comparisons of 
China and India’s progress.  In some ways, they may not be so different.  Dieter Ernst’s 
work on global innovation networks in the electronics industry, for example, describes 
both Beijing and Bangalore as third-tier “catching up” locations, lagging behind first-tier 
“global centers of excellence” like Silicon Valley as well as second-tier “advanced 
locations” in Israel, Ireland, South Korea, and Taiwan (Ernst 2009, ix).  In other ways, 
however, they do seem to be developing at very different rates.  Relying on a range of 
different indicators, several scholars have emphasized that China has progressed farther 
and faster than India, albeit to different degrees (Dahlman 2010; Chaudhuri 2012; 
Altenburg, Schmitz, and Stamm 2008).   
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To the extent that systematic differences between China and India can be 
identified, we should ask how they can be explained.  Dahlman suggests that China’s 
faster progress reflects a combination of greater openness and greater efforts to develop 
indigenous technologies.  Yet it is also worth asking how much China’s faster economic 
growth and greater market size have contributed to this tendency.  Brandt and Thun, in 
particular, have noted the role that China’s market size has played in creating 
opportunities for domestic firms (Brandt and Thun 2010; Brandt and Thun 2011).  There 
are also other possible explanations that might be explored.  These include differences in 
the national innovation systems of both countries, or possibly the extent to which 
governance is centralized in each country (Drezner 2001).  Scholars have also argued that 
the key question is a political commitment to addressing market failures and creating 
international linkages (Breznitz 2007) or, more recently, national threat perceptions 
(Taylor 2012).  In short, there are a range of potential explanations for differences in 
innovation performance between China and India that could be explored.  
 It would also be useful to explore in more depth the variations between particular 
sectors in China and India.  Bruche observes that China and India loom largest in global 
R&D in ICT, followed by the pharmaceuticals and automotive industries.  He suggests 
that this reflects the size of the ICT industry and its global orientation (Bruche 2009, 
277).  Yet there is also considerable variation within ICT.   U.S. companies remain 
preeminent in software, both in terms of intellectual property generated and revenue, but 
some Chinese companies have emerged as important players in hardware.  Steinfeld and 
Nahm, meanwhile, seem most impressed by China’s role in the development of new 
energy technologies – notably wind, solar, and nuclear (Nahm and Steinfeld 2012).  
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There is thus a great degree of variation within China and India that deserves greater 
scrutiny as well.  
Studies exploring variation between and within China and India would add 
insights and contribute further nuance to the debate identified in this article.  Yet they 
could also make connections with the broader literature on technological development in 
developing countries.  In recent years, for example, a number of scholars have suggested 
that attributes that promote technological catch-up – particularly the interventionist 
tactics of the developmental state – can become problematic when the focus becomes 
innovation at the technological frontier (Drezner 2001, 19–22; Breznitz 2007, 13–15; 
Wong 2011; Fong 1998, 341–43).  As Joseph Wong writes, the point is not that no 
intervention is warranted, but it must be more limited, and “picking winners” is virtually 
impossible when the challenge is promoting innovation in science-based industries 
(Wong 2011, 14).  While neither China nor India fits the classic developmental state 
model, both countries have had highly interventionist states in the past, and both 
governments have worked to promote domestic technology companies in recent years – 
with particular enthusiasm in the Chinese case.  It is thus worth asking what insights this 
body of research can shed on China and India’s development, as well as what lessons 
their experiences have for this growing literature.  Indeed, as noted above, Naughton has 
already made a connection, warning that China seems to be applying catch-up tactics to 
innovation challenges. 
 If the variation between and within China and India deserves more attention, the 
most important gap in the literature is the lack of critical thinking about the relationship 
between innovation and power in the 21st century.  Indeed, most of the literature in this 
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field devotes much more attention to the innovative capacity of China and India than to 
the relationship between such capacity and national power.  In many ways, this is 
understandable.  Some scholars are simply not concerned with power; it is their purpose 
to focus on technological innovation for its own sake, or to shed light on economic 
development more broadly.  Scholars who do take an interest in power, in turn, may 
simply assume that greater capacity for innovation means greater national power and 
leave it at that.  As suggested at the outset of this essay, international relations scholars 
have long seen technological creativity as an important source of national power.  Must 
anything else be said? 
The answer is yes.  First, and most basically, it must be emphasized that power is 
not a possession of individual states, but instead arises from relationships between them.  
Believing otherwise, Hans Morgenthau once suggested, “is one of the most frequent and 
elemental errors in international politics” (Morgenthau 1961, 154).  Accordingly, studies 
that document development in China or India, but do not compare their development with 
that of other countries, do not shed light on the power of these two states.  The point here 
is not to find fault with studies that make no pretense of assessing Chinese or Indian 
power.  Instead, it is merely to point out that these studies must be put in a larger context 
before they can help address this question.   
Fortunately, studies interested in the “technological power” of China or India 
often do put them in some kind of comparative context.  Typically, such studies focus on 
the distribution of some resource (or set of resources) that is believed to confer power 
when it is relatively abundant.  The resource in question varies from study to study; it 
might be national R&D spending, the number of invention patents recorded, the quality 
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of the national innovation system, or the amount and quality of human capital in science 
and technology.  Comparing such national resources undoubtedly remains important.  It 
is insufficient, however, in a world in which innovation processes often transcend 
national borders.  In 2010, U.S. companies invested nearly US$40 billion in R&D 
overseas through their foreign affiliates, with Asian countries receiving around 20 percent 
of the total (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013a).  Foreign firms, meanwhile, spent 
more than $42 billion on R&D in the U.S (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013b).  
This new and growing form of interdependence means that we must consider not only 
what countries can accomplish on their own but also the implications of what they are 
doing collaboratively.  To be sure, some scholars, particularly those preoccupied with 
GINs and human capital flows, show some appreciation of this point.  We have yet to 
ascertain, however, how China and India’s contributions to global innovation processes 
influences the balance of power between the countries involved. 
Toward this end, scholars might usefully draw upon the literature on complex 
interdependence.  As Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have explained, interdependence 
can generate power relationships to the extent that it is asymmetric, i.e. one side is more 
vulnerable to a disruption of the relationship than the other (Keohane and Nye 1977).  
Nye has recently added that “perfect symmetry is quite rare, so most cases of economic 
interdependence also involve a potential power relationship” (Nye 2011, 55).  Indeed, 
while China in particular has come to play an increasingly vital role in the world 
economy, the MLP was inspired in part by the perception that its relationship with the 
developed world remains decidedly unequal.  In this context, it is important to ask: to 
what degree technological development in China and India is making their 
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interdependence with developed countries, and particularly with the United States, more 
symmetric?  Some of the work reviewed above on GINs suggests that considerable 
asymmetry persists.  On the other hand, other scholars have emphasized how China’s 
“secondary innovation” or “innovative manufacturing” complements the work done in 
more developed locales – and that its contributions in this regard would be difficult to 
replace (Breznitz and Murphree 2011; Nahm and Steinfeld 2012).  There is also much 
work to be done in documenting the degree of asymmetry across different industries. 
How do information technology, biotechnology, and new energy – to pick three 
prominent examples – compare in this regard?  Most generally, the fact that China and 
India are involved in global technological innovation at all – and that MNCs are 
involving them in their own R&D efforts – would seem to be a step forward for these 
countries.  Discerning just how much of a step they have taken, and where their next 
steps might take them, are questions that deserve greater scrutiny in the future. 
A final point is that the relevance of technological capabilities to national power 
depends on context.  That is, it is important to know not only which countries are being 
compared, but also what the specific issue in contention is.  Nuclear weapons may be a 
key source of leverage in superpower crises, but worthless in counter-insurgency 
campaigns.  To the extent that China and India are emerging as new hubs of innovation, 
then, we must ask in what contexts their power is enhanced – and in what contexts it is 
unaffected or even constrained.  The answers may not be obvious.  Nahm and Steinfeld 
point out that China has come to play an important role in new energy innovation, for 
example (Nahm and Steinfeld 2012).  Yet this development has not apparently enhanced 
China’s ability to deter or resist trade sanctions in this sphere:  developed countries have 
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repeatedly pressured China over its support for new energy firms in recent years, and 
China has frequently backed down in response (A. B. Kennedy 2013).  In the military 
sphere, some suggest that foreign ICT firms doing research in China are effectively 
training a generation of Chinese cyber-warriors.  “Thousands of engineers,” it is alleged, 
“are working to develop capabilities that could easily be drafted for cyberwarfare” 
(Tonelson 2013).  Just how relevant such research is to cyberwarfare is debatable, 
however, and it is unclear that China actually needs foreign companies to develop such 
capabilities.  Lastly, it is possible that the emergence of innovation in China and India 
could augment their soft power.  Nye writes that “a successful economic model not only 
produces the latent military resources for the exercise of hard power, but it can also 
attract others to emulate its example” (Nye 2011, 52).  Whether China or India has a 
distinctive model to offer the world, however, remains a hotly debated subject (S. 
Kennedy 2010).  In short, a great deal more research is warranted before we understand 
how the emergence of innovation in China and India is augmenting their power – and 
how it is not. 
 
*  *  * 
 
While the emergence of China and India as technological powers has attracted 
increasing attention in recent years, we are only beginning to understand what is 
happening and what the consequences might be.  In general, scholarship in this field has 
focused on the emerging capacity for innovation in these two countries. The debate that 
has emerged has generated a variety of useful insights, but very little in the way of 
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consensus.  To some extent, this outcome is difficult to avoid: there is no “correct” 
definition of innovation and no “correct” way of measuring it, even if some approaches 
are more open to criticism than others.  Much less attention, in turn, has been devoted to 
whether and how China and India’s changing innovative capacities are reshaping the 
distribution of power in the international system.  This latter question is equally 
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Notes
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The so-called megaprojects include core electronic devices, high-end generic chips and basic software; 
large-scale integrated circuit manufacturing technology and associated techniques; next generation 
broadband mobile telecommunication; high-end numerically controlled machine tools and basic 
manufacturing technology; large-scale oil and gas exploration; large advanced nuclear reactors; water 
contamination control and treatment; new genetically modified organisms; major new pharmaceutical 
products; prevention and treatment of major infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS; large aircraft; high 
resolution earth observation systems; manned space flights and lunar probe; and three undisclosed projects 
believed to serve military purposes. 
 
2 The seven industries include energy and environmental conservation, next generation information 
technology, high-end equipment manufacturing, biotechnology, new energy, new materials, and new 
automotive. 
 
3 Drawing on Herman Kahn’s work on Japan, Preeg defines a “superstate” as “a nation that will almost 
certainly achieve great economic, technological, and financial status, that will very likely become 
financially and politically powerful in international affairs, and that will inevitably strive to become a 
military superpower as well” (2).  It remains unclear what a technology superstate is, however, though 
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